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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintifl7Appellant, 
vs. 
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ, 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
Case No. 990470-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and § 77-18a-l(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in quashing the bindover and 
dismissing the information against Perez because his alleged conduct did not rise to the 
level of "damage" or "injury" to a jail required for conviction under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-8-418. This Court should review this issue under "an abuse of 
discretion" standard which affords the trial court's legal conclusions little deference but 
overturns his factual findings only if "clearly erroneous." See Rule 25(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (granting trial court discretion to order dismissal of criminal 
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information). See also, State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265 (Utah 1998) (trial court has 
discretion in its ruling regarding motion for new trial). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, 
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of 
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State appeals from the grant of Perez's motion to quash the bind-over and the 
order of dismissal entered into this case by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Daniel Cruz Perez was charged by information filed on or about February 19, 
1998, in Fourth District Court with Damaging a Jail, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 (R. 4). At a preliminary hearing, Perez moved to 
dismiss the charge (Prelim. Tr. at 17). The magistrate denied his motion and he was 
bound over for arraignment (R. 72). 
Perez filed a motion to quash the bind over and dismiss the charge (R. 85). Judge 
Hansen granted his motion and dismissed the charge on April 13, 1999 (R. 103). 
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Specifically, Judge Hansen found that courts must apply "a case-by-case approach to 
determine whether any injury to a jail constitutes 'damage'" under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-5-418 and that the "otherwise damages" language in the statute "must be restricted 
to conduct of a similar nature and comparative gravity to the behavior defined in the 
statute" (R. 101). Accordingly, Judge Hansen found that scratching a word in a cell door 
is incomparable to "breaking, pulling down, destroying, or flooding" and that such a 
scratch does not "interfere with the functions of the jail or constitutes any type of 
substantial injury to the facility" (R. 101). 
On May 13, 1999, the State filed a Notice of Appeal and this action commenced 
(R. 106). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 25, 1998, Daniel Cruz Perez was arrested and booked into the Utah 
County Jail (Prelim. Tr. at 6). Because Perez refused to cooperate with the booking 
process, he was placed into a holding cell where he continued to yell and bang on the cell 
door with his hands (Prelim. Tr. at 6-7). When Perez calmed down, he was removed 
from the cell and came out holding two keys and a penny (Prelim. Tr. at 13). After he 
was removed from the cell, the booking officer found that the word "fuck" had been 
scratched into the back door of the cell in 4-6 inch letters (Prelim. Tr. at 8). The cell door 
required two coats of paint to remove the scratch (Prelim. Tr. at 12). Perez denied 
scratching the word into the door (Prelim Tr. at 9). 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Perez asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the 
bindover and ordering dismissal of the information against him. Although the phrase 
"otherwise damages" does have a definable meaning, that meaning is ambiguous when 
viewed in the context of the statute as a whole. The Utah Supreme Court has set a 
precedent in limiting the meaning of broad--yet plain—terms used in criminal statutes 
where that language is non-specific and potentially ambiguous in its context. 
Accordingly, Perez asserts that the trial court was correct in restricting the term 
"otherwise damages" to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity of that 
specifically defined in the statute. Moreover, Perez argues that decisions from this Court 
support that position. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING THE CHARGE AGAINST PEREZ BECAUSE HIS 
CONDUCT DID NOT RISE TO THE REQUISITE LEVEL OF DAMAGE 
OR INJURY TO A JAIL REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION 
Perez was charged by criminal information with Damaging a Jail, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 (R. 4). After a preliminary 
hearing where Perez was bound-over on the charge, Perez filed a motion to quash the 
bindover and dismiss the information (R. 85). Judge Hansen granted his motion and the 
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State appealed (R. 101-03). The conduct for which Perez was accused consisted of 
scratching the word "fuck" in the holding cell door at the Utah County JaiL 
Rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure grants trial courts the 
discretion to dismiss a criminal information "for substantial cause and in furtherance of 
justice." Moreover, Rule 25(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a 
trial court to dismiss a criminal information when "the allegations of the information... do 
not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed." Perez asserts 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal information 
against him because "the scratching of a door inside a jail in no way interferes with the 
functions of the jail or constitutes any type of substantial injury to the facility" (R. 101). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 reads: " A person who willfully and intentionally 
breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other 
place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." While the words 
"otherwise damages" do have a definable meaning, that meaning is ambiguous when 
viewed in the context of the statute as a whole. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court 
has set a precedent in limiting the meaning of broad—yet plain—terminology used in 
criminal statutes where that language is non-specific and potentially ambiguous in its 
context. 
For example, Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-404.1 defines the crime of sexual abuse 
of a child. The statute specifically sets forth conduct which would constitute the crime 
but also includes a general liability for any conduct where an individual "otherwise takes 
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indecent liberties" with a child. In State ex relJ.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court examined the meaning of "otherwise takes indecent liberties" and 
concluded that the term could only pass constitutional muster if read as "referring to 
conduct of the same magnitude of gravity as that specifically described in the statute." 
610P.2datl296. 
In reaching its decision, the Utah Supreme Court clearly applied the principle of 
ejusdem generis in deciding that "otherwise takes indecent liberties" was not a catch-all 
phrase that encompassed all possible lewd conduct but rather was a phrase that must be 
interpreted in light of the specific conduct set forth in the remainder of the statute. In 
relation to this, the Court stated: 
In interpretation of Section 76-5-404(1), the format of the statute is 
significant. In the first part, the legislature describes in detail the specific 
conduct proscribed, viz., the actor's touching the anus or genitals of 
another. In the second part, which is separated from the first by the 
disjunction "or" the conduct is set forth in generalized terms, viz., 
"otherwise takes indecent liberties with another." The use of the 
disjunctive in combination with the term "otherwise" is indicative of an 
intent to proscribe the type of conduct of equal gravity to that interdicted in 
the first part, although the acts are committed in a different way or manner 
than that set forth in the first part." 
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J.L.S., 610 P.2d at 1295. The court, therefore, found that the definition of "indecent 
liberties" and the scope of the statute was limited-rather than expanded—by the phrase 
"or otherwise". The court in J.L. S. made this determination despite the fact that both 
"indecent" and "liberties" like "damages" have a plain meaning. 
Perez asserts that the trial court was correct in his determination that the grafitti 
Perez is alleged to have written on the holding cell door cannot be considered "damage" 
within the meaning of the law. Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 reads: " A person who 
willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise 
damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree." 
The proscribed conduct which is expressly enumerated in this section includes 
breaking down, pulling down, destroying, or flooding. All of these are clearly acts that 
either cause or create a risk of significant destruction and which impede or interfere with 
the proper functions of a jail. Perez asserts that the trial court was correct in limiting the 
application of the more general prohibition found in the statutes "or otherwise damages" 
language to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity. 
The State has argued that the plain language of § 76-8-418 and this Court's 
decision in State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App.), cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993), mandate that the phrase "otherwise damages" apply to any damage whatsoever 
(Br. of Appellant at 4-6). Although this Court in dicta did adopt in Pharris a broad 
definition of the term "injury" or "damage", this Court utilized what amounts to a case-
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by-case approach in making it determination whether the conduct of the defendant was 
sufficient to establish culpability under the statute. 
The defendant in Pharris, repeatedly flushed a clogged toilet which resulted in at 
least 85 gallons of water pouring onto the floor of the cell and adjoining day room and 
water seeping into the basement soaking the backup generator. 846 P.2d at 457. In 
addition, the defendant broke the welds on his bunk which-like the rest of his cell, the 
day room and basement generator—rendered it unusable. Id. Only under these facts did 
this Court rule that the statute was not void for vagueness as applied to the defendant 
because his conduct was in line with the statute's "objective of fully protecting the 
facilities essential to the functioning of a jail" in that his actions "caused injury to 
portions of the jail facility that are essential to its functioning." Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466, 
467. 
Accordingly although this Court called for a broad interpretation of the term 
"injury" or "damages" under the statute, it found liability only where the conduct is of the 
same type and gravity as that specifically enumerated in the statute—namely conduct that 
damages or injures portions of the jail facility that are essential to its proper functioning 
and legislative purpose. Therefore, Perez asserts that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling that "scratching a word in a cell door is incomparable to breaking, 
pulling down, destroying, or flooding" and that defendant's conduct "in no way 
interfere[d] with the functions of the jail or constitute^] any type of substantial injury to 
the facility" (R. 101-02). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Perez asks this Court affirm the trial court's quashing of the bindover and 
dismissing the charge against him. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tj_ day of December, 1999. 
VlA^(7. ^/^A T Margaret'P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Daniel Cruz Perez 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief to Scott Wilson, Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 E. 300 South, 6th 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this J^day of December, 1999. 
31. 
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ADDENDA 
10 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 981403595 
DATE: April 13, 1999 
ORDER 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Being fully advised of the facts in this matter, the bindover order in this matter is quashed 
and the information ordered dismissed. 
DATED this / J - d a y of. . 1999. 
BY THE C O l M O 
cc: Christine Johnson 
Phillip Hadfield 
CARMA B&?m5°r/ t e 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 981403595 
DATE: April 13, 1999 
RULING 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover and Dismiss. Having 
reviewed all relevant memoranda on this issue, as well as the October 21, 1998 ruling which 
bound this case over for trial, this Court hereby grants the Defendant's motion. 
On January 25, 1998, the Defendant was booked into the Utah County Jail. As part of the 
booking process, Deputy Matt Pederson placed the Defendant in Pre-booking cell #2. While in 
the pre-booking cell, the Defendant cursed loudly and kicked the cell door several times, stopping 
this behavior only after warnings from the deputy. As Deputy Pederson removed the Defendant 
was from the pre-booking cell he saw that the Defendant had in his possession two keys and one 
penny. Upon inspection of the cell, Deputy Pederson saw the word 'Tuck" with a line under it 
scratched into the back of the cell door in letters measuring approximately four to six inches in 
height. 
Based on these events, the Defendant was bound over to stand trial for the offense of 
Damaging a Jail, a Third Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (Supp. 1998). Under this 
section: 
i 
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or 
otherwise damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (Supp. 1998). This Court finds that the "otherwise damages" 
language in the statute must be restricted to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity to 
the behavior defined in the statute. Courts must apply a case-by-case approach to determine 
whether any injury to a jail constitutes "damage" under the statute. See State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 
454, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Clearly, scratching a word in a cell door is incomparable to 
breaking, pulling down, destroying, or flooding. In addition, scratching a door inside of a jail in 
no way interferes with the functions of the jail or constitutes any type of substantial injury to the 
facility. IdL As such, I find that the behavior in this case does not consist of "damage" under the 
statute. 
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